Committees linking national administrations and the EU level play a crucial role at all stages of the EU policy process. The literature tends to portray this group system as a coherent mass, characterised by expert-oriented 'deliberative supranationalism', a term developed through studies of comitology (implementation) committees. This article builds on survey data on 218 national officials in 14 Member States who have attended EU committee meetings. We show that these groups do indeed exhibit important common features. Firstly, expert knowledge rather than country size plays a pivotal role in the decision making process. Secondly, across types of committee, participants evoke multiple allegiances and identities. Although loyalty to various national institutions is most frequently expressed, a considerable proportion also has a sense of belonging to the committees as such. However, we also demonstrate that there is significant variation among types of committee. Council and comitology groups both display behavioural patterns that are strongly intergovernmental in character, while Commission committees seem more multi-faceted in this respect. Although our primary aim here is to give a unique empirical account, our main observations are interpreted from an institutional and organisational perspective.
Committees are an essential part of the functioning of modern governance. Some committees are official, whilst others are unofficial or even ad hoc. They play a crucial role in the daily operation of the European Union (EU) system of governance by providing expertise in policy development and decision-making, by linking Member-States' governments and administrations with the EU level as well as by increasing the acceptance of European laws and programs in the member-states. EU committees are important arenas for EU governance as well as melting pots of national and supranational government systems. In various guises, committees are active at every stage of the political process within the EU machineryassisting the Commission in drafting legislation, preparing the dossiers on which the Council takes decisions and supervising the implementation of EC law by the Commission. The latter are generally referred to as comitology committees, although the term is sometimes extended to include all committees. 2 This article is the result of an extensive research project comparing domestic government officials attending Commission expert committees (ECs), Council working parties (CWPs) and comitology committees (CCs). For the first time, survey data that make it possible to compare in a systematic way how the three main types of EU committees really function are presented. One of our main observations is that sweeping generalisations on how the system works should be avoided. Rather than dealing with committees as a coherent mass that basically displays the same characteristics (as in Wessels' 'fusion thesis'
3 ), our portrayal mirrors a system of governance with several faces. Firstly, Council groups appear very much as intergovernmental arenas in the sense that participants primarily seem to behave as representatives of their home governments. Officials advocate policy positions that routinely have been subject to coordination processes in their respective national administrations, and they often bring with them instructions on how to act. We think that the general availability of interpreting facilities from all languages into other languages clearly symbolises the presence of highly intergovernmental components in this particular context. Secondly, we unveil that comitology committees exhibit many of the same basically intergovernmental features as the Council working parties. This is surprising since previous research tends to portray comitology as an arena in which participants proceed from being representatives of national interests to becoming representatives of a Europeanised inter-administrative discourse. 4 Thirdly, our findings suggest that Commission expert committees represent a setting that is significantly different from the two former ones. Concerning expert committees, participants usually evoke in practice a broader repertoire of roles, thus, the behavioural pattern that follows become more multi-faceted than what characterises intergovernmental interaction.
Moreover, expert committee attendants obviously have more leeway than those on other committees; they are not very much involved in coordination processes at the national level, and they seldom bring with them a clear mandate on how to act. In addition, the decision situation seems considerably more relaxed as far as language use is concerned: expert committees have, in common with comitology committees, that interpretation is usually available for only a few languages.
However, the picture of committee governance is more complicated than that. This article shows that EU committees also share some important properties. First, the role of expertise is pivotal across all types of committee. Participants assign more weight to arguments advocated by members who have demonstrated considerable expertise on the subject matter at hand than to views advanced by colleagues from large Member States as such. Given the huge amount of attention devoted to the formal voting power of the various countries in the Council, this is an interesting result. 5 Secondly, a considerable proportion of the committee members express allegiance to the committee in which they participate, although this proportion is clearly smaller than the proportion who express loyalty to national institutions. This observation on multiple allegiances is important since it may contribute to diminish the controversy over whether loyalty transfer from the national to the supranational level takes place or not. While Wessels 6 asserts that, contrary to certain neo-functional assumptions, no such transfer has happened, Laffan 7 seems to take the opposite position. Thirdly, an overwhelming majority of national officials across committee types expresses trust in the Commission in the sense that they perceive Commission officials in committees to act mainly independently from particular national interests. A clear majority in fact holds Commission officials as among their main interlocutors during meetings. And, finally, 70 per cent say English is the language most frequently used in informal discussions.
Although the main purpose of this article is to report what we see as important findings from an empirical project, the observations referred above raise some crucial theoretical questions.
How are the many faces of EU committee governance to be accounted for? The institutionalist turn in European integration studies focuses (or refocuses) on the role that institutions play in shaping actors' role conceptions, interests and identities. 8 However, one could argue that in order to specify the conditions under which this may actually happen one has to 'unpack' institutions (if we are dealing with 'concrete' institutions) to see how they are organised. 9 Thus, the marked difference between Council and comitology committees on the one hand, and Commission groups on the other, may be explained by the different organisational structures that we find in the two settings. The basically territorially arranged
Council and comitology setting (in the sense that it builds on the representation of national governments as such) imposes other role expectations on participants than the sectorally and functionally organised Commission.
Although the Council is basically structured according to territory, it is at the same time sectorally and functionally arranged at the ministerial and working party levels. We find a similar 'dual structure' in comitology committees. The organisational embodiment of 'functionality' across committee types may help explain the crucial role that expertise seems to play in all committee decision making. The sectoral or functional affiliation that participants have in common across nationality provides a shared frame of reference and a fertile ground for policy making based on expert arguments. Finally, since EU committees represent rather secondary organisational affiliations for most national officials (who use most of their time and energy in national institutions), it is no wonder that 'supranational' allegiances are only partly expressed. However, quite understandable from an organisational perspective, these allegiances do complement national loyalties.
The article proceeds in five main steps. The first section describes and discusses the data and the methodology underpinning the study. The second section reports on the time requirements and the availability of documentation for domestic officials who attend EU committees. The third section reports the interpretation facilities available for the committee participants and the languages actually used by them. The fourth section reveals the loyalties and identities adopted by domestic EU committee participants, and the fifth section shows how these officials are co-ordinated domestically.
DATA AND METHOD Like in all written questionnaires, there was a considerable number of missing itemsrespondents who did not complete all of the questions, even if -as was the case in our questionnaire -for most of the questions multiple choice answers were provided for. For this reason the N will vary between tables in the following sections.
TIME REQUIREMENTS AND THE AVAILABILITY OF DOCUMENTATION
For member-state officials, participation in EU committees means consumption of scarce resources like time, time that will not be available for national concerns. Table II shows that time spent on EU matters varies with the place in the hierarchy of a respondent. Veggeland. 13 Surprising is the relatively large proportion (20%) who come from the Director General or Deputy Director General level. 14 This can possibly be explained by the fact that it is common practice that, on important issues, the top level of Member-States' administrations will attend committee meetings in Brussels, often accompanied by lower level officials. It may also be taken as an indicator of the importance assigned by Member-States' administrations to EU matters. The fact that more than 60% of this top-level group spends almost a day or more of their weekly working time on EU matters supports this conclusion.
Moreover, Council working party participants report that they seldom attend committee meetings alone. Most of the time officials go together with colleagues from their own ministry or from the permanent representations.
Involvement in EU affairs may affect one's attitude to European integration positively or negatively. If a member-state's civil servant spends a lot of his working time with EU matters, he or she may, for instance, get increasingly fed up with it or conversely develop an increased appreciation of the importance of EU issues for Member-State administrations. The majority of the sampled officials had positive attitudes towards European integration when they first got involved in EU committee work. Table III shows that the majority of respondents did not change their attitude towards European integration later. There are significant differences with respect to the frequency and duration of meetings between expert committees, Council working parties and comitology committees (see Table   IV ). The vast majority of the sampled officials have attended one or two committees. Only a very small percentage of the officials have actually attended more than two committees.
These observations might partly reflect the fact that officials at the permanent representations in Brussels are poorly represented in our sample. Lewis 16 Finally, a reasonable assumption would be that documentation is a necessary condition for policy preparation. It has been frequently reported, that documentation for committee meetings arrives only shortly before the meetings take place. 19 Table VI shows that in expert committees and comitology committees in well over 50% of the cases, documentation is in the hands of the participant a week or more before the meeting takes place. The situation in Council working parties is quite different. Two thirds of the respondents reported that documentation arrives only a day or two before the meeting. This suggests that the pace of work in Council is the most intense and that Member-State officials are often confronted with documentation at the very last minute. In the case of comitology committees, 14% reported that documentation is only available at the time of the meeting. These are probably committees in the agricultural sector, which meet weekly or bi-weekly. These committees are dealing largely with routine matters where preparation of the participants is not required. The results suggest that the situation may not be as bad as it is often pictured: more than 85% of the participants have the relevant documentation in their hands before they arrive in the meeting room. And those attending meetings chaired by the frequently criticised Commission (expert and comitology committees), are in fact better equipped in this respect than those in Council groups. Table VII indicates the intergovernmental nature of the Council working parties compared to the expert and comitology committees. 
MEMBER-STATE OFFICIALS' LOYALTIES AND IDENTITIES
Civil servants often evoke multiple preferences, interests, roles and identities due to their multiple institutional embeddedness. Civil servants are multiple selves with several nonhierarchical interests and allegiances. 21 The evocation of one particular interest or identity does not necessarily trump another. By attending different institutions at different levels of governance officials learn to wear Janus-faces and to live with diversity and partially conflicting interests and loyalties. 22 Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 23 picture a "Continuous tension between the home affiliation and the pull of the collective forum". However, particular roles, identities and modes of decision-making behaviour tend to be evoked in some situations more than in others. 24 National officials attending EU committees spend most of their time and energy in national administrations 25 . Accordingly, we expect their dominant institutional allegiances and identifications to be national when entering EU committees. However, "membership" in EU committees imposes additional obligations on officials, although for most of a secondary character. They are exposed to new agendas and actors, and are expected to look for common solutions. 26 According to Christiansen and Kirchner 27 , "committees permit national officials to familiarise themselves with the nature of the EU's administrative system". However, officials participating in Council working parties and in comitology committees may be expected to behave more like government representatives than officials attending Commission expert committees. The main reason for this is the basically territorial principle of organisation underlying both Council and comitology groups. In the Commission expert committees, on the other hand, participants are expected to behave more like independent experts. Thus, professional allegiances and sectoral role conceptions are likely to be enacted fairly strongly among the latter. Table X shows that national officials who attend different EU committees express more allegiance towards their own national government institutions than towards the EU committees on which they participate. Thus as expected, supranational loyalties seem to be secondary to national allegiances. However, some officials feel considerable responsibility towards EU level entities, particularly the Council working party participants. 28 Hence, a certain kind of 'supranational', or system, allegiance seems to be stronger among Council working party officials than among expert committee and comitology committee participants.
Intergovernmentalism and 'supranationalism' thus seem not to conflict but to complement each other. 29 Moreover, the vast majority of the committee participants have positive attitudes towards European integration generally and within their "own" policy/issue area particularly.
However, relatively few officials change attitudes in this regard due to committee participation (see table III above). Next, the respondents were asked to asses how much consideration they put on proposals, statements and arguments from different actors and institutions when attending EU committees. 31 , the quality of the argument presented by other committee participants is considered more important than the sheer size and geopolitical location of the member-states they represent. Moreover, the EU Commission is also considered more important than large
Member-States and Member-States within their own region. This may be interpreted as reflecting an element of supranational identification among the committee participants.
Finally, interest groups and firms are deemed considerably less important than colleagues from other Member-States. By comparison, however, interest groups and firms from their own country are considered much more important than EU level interest groups and firms.
This observation underscores the general tendency apparent in Table XII , namely that national officials attending EU committees pay more heed to national institutions than to supranational ones.
In sum, what we see is that arguing, not only bargaining, is a salient feature of the system. 32 Hence, the intergovernmental perspective, picturing national actors entering EU arenas with predetermined and fixed preferences has to be slightly modified. Obviously, deliberation is taking place among actors in which interests may be moved and reshaped on the basis of expert knowledge.
Moreover, there is obviously also a good deal of trust in the Commission, as further underpinned by Table XIII. Table XIII about territory accompany stronger co-ordination pressure on the participants than committees organised by sector and function. 34 Secondly, voting focuses the attention of decision-makers.
Voting also signals expectations from the principals towards the agents with respect to representing agreed-on and often written "positions". In contrast to comitology committees, expert committees and Council working parties do not vote in any formal sense 35 . Council working parties are, however, located more clearly in the "shadow of the vote" than Commission expert committees. 36 Whereas expert committee participants are not expected to reach any agreements or formal decisions during most committee meetings, officials attending the Council working groups and the comitology committees are expected to reach compromises, majority decisions and often consensus at the end of meetings. Council working party participants seem, however, to pay more attention to national interests than do expert committees and comitology committee participants. 38 These differences are marginal, however. The most significant observation is that in Commission expert committees, participants have much more leeway to follow "their" own position than in the Council working parties and the comitology committees. 
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